"Always remember FVR's 'Triple S' - Safety of hostages (paramount), Single command, and Single point of communications..." - USec. Paul Dominguez (Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, 1992-1998) This column would have wanted to keep quiet about the shocking and internationalized tragedy at the Quirino Grandstand last 23 August. On second thought, FVR feels it his duty as "one who had been there and done it" in many similar death-dealing situations over a period of some 12 years to write about "best practices" in resolving crises from hostage-taking, airline hijackings (1978-1985), and coup attempts (1986-1990). Crisis not over At this point, the P-Noy Administration is amidst damage control/mitigation. Concurrently, government strategists must work out damage prevention/preemption of diverse scenarios arising out of unexpected happenings. Strategic planning to cover worst-case scenarios must be pursued so that lessons are internalized and "best practices" developed to capably handle future emergencies. Crisis situations that threaten not only innocent persons under coercion but also damage the image/stability of government itself must be strategized - before, during, and after. The 23 August hostage-taking fiasco is by no means over.
Deeply traumatic as the killing of eight harmless foreigners and wounding of others has been, the worst effects thereof are still bound to impact on government credibility, international relations and people's morale. The "Triple S" formula Above quotation by USec. Dominguez underpinned both field S.O.Ps. and national policies and were repeatedly impressed upon AFP/PNP personnel and civilian officials. The safety of hostages is paramount; their well-being is the foremost mission. On the ground, only one single commander calls the shots. Operating team members may act on emerging opportunities, but always according to "Triple S" coordination/teamwork. The single ground commander who manages the immediate tactical situation is, inescapably, responsible for what his unit does or fails to do. The single point of communications brings up the existence of a ground level Crisis Committee which works out strategies for resolving the situation quickly/successfully. The C.C. is headed by the Chief of the "Office of Primary Responsibility." He decides on problems beyond ground operations, notably medical/social services, public information and media rules of engagement. Controlled communications insure that non-accountable kibitzers do not interfere.
Above the local level would be a regional operating Task Force and an equivalent C.C. - as necessitated by developments. At national level, a PNP/AFP Task Force would be alerted to take over/reinforce local operations and a Cabinet C.C. under an OPR takes control of the strategic play, especially keeping the President informed. In all instances, the "Triple S" protocol is religiously observed. Minimal collateral damage That the FVR-era policies/procedures, tactics/strategies, and civil-police-military cooperation worked effectively can be determined by results of hostage/ terrorist situations during 1992-1998. Such were resolved with dispatch, minimal collateral damage, and limited fall-out on Malacañang. During that period, there were not even "adventurous military movements," much less coup attempts. And, Filipinos at home or abroad did not suffer from lowered morale because of bungled operations. On record were the Abu Sayaff raid on Ipil, Zamboanga Sur in April, 1995 and the massive protests following Flor Contemplacion's execution in Singapore in March, 1995. Both, of course, were happenings quite different from the recent hostaging; but in the earlier situations, the "Triple S" formula also worked. Voluntary Cabinet resignations Let me set the record straight re General Ramon Farolan's column in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (30 August) where he gave compelling reasons why DILG Secretary Robredo "has to go." He cited the Contemplacion situation wherein "President FVR sacked Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo and Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor." In fairness to them, Secretaries Romulo and Confesor assumed responsibility for the Contemplacion unrest and voluntarily resigned their positions - not sacked - before the situation got worse. Their admirable "cutting cleanly" has become a rarity in public service, even when circumstances demands. Alunan speaks Former DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan permitted me to quote from his recent letter to Former Senior Government Officials: "When it was known that foreigners were involved, alarm bells would have rung. As SILG and Chair of the National Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Terrorism, I would have promptly called the President to inform him of the situation which was being beamed worldwide. "At that point, he would instruct Task Force Lily (FVR's Crisis Management Team) to monitor the situation. The National Security Adviser and at least the Secretaries of the DFA, DILG, DND, and the Press Secretary (who was the President's lone spokesman) would be called to join TF Lily for the duration of the crisis. "NACAHT would be activated and a C.C. constituted consisting of the Manila Mayor, PNP Chief, and Department senior reps. "A ground commander would be designated, who would map out plans for negotiating the safe release of all hostages, disabling the hostage-taker, and, if necessary, 'execute' the final option (there are several methods, all requiring meticulous planning). "Based on that, a topnotch negotiator, a psychologist and Hostage Rescue Team would be chosen. NACAHT would quickly review the plans and once approved, it would be the ground commander's play all the way, unless unforeseen factors arise. " Using right people Continues Alunan: "By noon, or about three hours after the drama began, FVR would have called the Chinese Embassy about the situation and measures being undertaken. At that point, he might have asked the Ambassador and his police attaché to provide advice to TF Lily and NACAHT. "These Presidential moves would be aired by the Press Secretary/ Spokesman while briefing the media on developments. "That said, the tragedy happened because we didn't have the right people in place calling the shots. Most of President Aquino III's crisis team are rookies without national experience. The hostage-taker was a former member of the Manila Police. The ground commander was the Manila Police Chief; the operatives chosen were from the Manila Police; and even Mayor Fred Lim is an ex-Manila Police Chief. "They probably all belong to the Manila Police-wide fraternity, the 'Brotherhood.' My view is that this was a psychological barrier that blurred focus/priorities. Early on, this risk should have been addressed by getting another HRT, preferably the Special Action Force, the premier PNP unit trained/equipped for such situations. "During my time, we arranged for the Australian Special Air Services and Israel's Yamam Special Counter-Terrorism Unit to train the SAF for various critical situations. I am not aware if their training and proficiency tests were sustained, as they should have, after FVR. No loss of life "In all the hostage situations I was directly involved in, among them, the Makati tourist trap in the December 1989 coup attempt and kidnappings of two Spanish nuns, Fr Bernardo Blanco, Charles Walton, the Barandino and Biel families, and 10 hikers in General Santos by the Abu Sayaff, not one life was lost. "Back to Quirino: because the wrong guys were on the job, it was a matter of time before the Rubicon would be crossed with disastrous results. One rule in hostage-taking is never agitate the hostage-taker. Second, if there is a golden opportunity to disable the hostage taker, grab it or grab him. There was at least one time when three negotiators were talking to the relaxed hostage-taker - within grabbing distance in full view of everyone. Third, fulfilling demands of a hostage-taker can be taken back later because these were obtained under duress. "The Crisis Committee could have arranged with the Ombudsman to issue a report that Rolando Mendoza had been cleared. He might have given up at that stage, then promptly disarmed, handcuffed, jailed and charged for kidnapping/attempted murder. "Could a tragedy have been avoided even if the right components were in place? Maybe not, but at least the world would have seen a professional/intelligent approach in crisis-handling. Lives could have still been lost, but at least the country's honor would not have taken such a beating." Consult the veterans Raffy Alunan, Paul Dominguez, Bobby Romulo, and Nieves Confesor are not the only ones who went through crisis situations in their time. Other veteran crisis-handlers like Rene de Villa, Ramon Montaño, Alex Aguirre, Rey Velasco, Edgardo Aglipay, and Sonny Razon are still around. As former Chief PNP and earlier SAF Commander, Aglipay offers the information that SAF units have "rescue vans" which carry the tools, equipment and gadgets needed, including rolls of detonating cord. He says that a precisely measured piece of "det-cord," placed surreptitiously near the hostage-taker, but away from the hostages, could have been detonated to stun/disable Rolando Mendoza to end the crisis with a happier ending. Please send any comments to fvr@rpdev.org.
